Reference and Representation

From Metapedia

Closely related to the question of mediation and the structure of signs is the problem of representation and referentiality in language. Philosophers of language in the 20th century have worked through the problem of how language can be said to refer to real things or to concepts outside specific statements. Logic and the truth-functions of scientific language were thought to depend on the ability to use language (in some formalized way) to refer to real things or states of affairs in the world. Statements of fact are known as "propositions" in logic (a statement which is either true or false). Statements are thus said to have "reference" or the property of "referentiality" in pointing to real things.

But today, most philosophers have concluded that logic is mainly internally self-referential and that using language to refer to things outside language in "the real world" is only one of thousands of things we do with language. Wittgenstein at first held a "picture theory" of logical and scientific propositions that represent, in the way that language can, a world of facts, or, in his terms, "whatever is the case," in the world. He then exposed the problems in this view. Language and statements follow their own rules (language games), and allow us to do and say certain things, but the relationship between our statements and the world outside them is not rule-governed. We can't step outside of language and look at the world in some kind of unmediated, extra-linguistic or pre-verbal state. Referring to real things, or using language to construct a category we call "real" about which statements can be made, is thus only one type of semiotic activity in the sign system of language. [See Stanford Encyclopedia entry on "reference."]